Report commissioned by the IASC Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluations
Steering Group as part of the Syria Coordinated Accountability and Lessons Learning Initiative
*Hugo Slim, Lorenzo Trombetta and Lewis Sida *
Introduction
This update should be read as part of the much longer Syria Crisis Common Context Analysis of June 2014. It highlights the most significant political and humanitarian developments in the Syria crisis between June 2014 and September 2015. The first section covers political developments and the second section focuses on humanitarian response.
Part one - Political developments
The situation in the summer of 2015
The dynamics of the Syrian conflict are constantly changing, sometimes in regards to a particular area within Syria and sometimes in regards to the country as a whole. In addition, there has been a close relationship between the events taking place in Syria and in Iraq, both regarding the attitude of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the reactions of the United States-led coalition.
Although major developments have taken place on the local level, there has not been a decisive turning point at the national and regional levels. Between late spring and early summer 2015, for example, the conflict dynamic began to change in favour of the local, national and regional opposition platforms. However, this shift was not a sign that the end of the war was approaching. In addition, a major obstacle to finding a political solution to the ongoing fighting was the growing number of local, national and regional actors that were benefiting economically from the war.
Syria has been effectively divided into zones of influence. In the north and south, Jordan and Turkey, supported by Saudi Arabia and the United States, respectively, have created buffer zones near the borders. Similarly, Israel has protected the area of the Golan from any conflict-related spill over. Iran, Russia and Lebanese Hezbollah have provided protection to the corridor of Damascus-Hama and the coastal region, a stronghold of the clans that have been in power in Syria for half a century. Coalitions of Armed Opposition Groups (AOGs), supported by Saudi Arabia and, in some cases, led by the Al Nusra Front (ANF), have established a potentate in the Idlib region. Aleppo city has continued to cause disputations between the Government of Syria (GoS) and various opposition armed groups, including ANF, and neither party has prevailed over the other. Central Syria has faced constant threats from ISIL. The Islamic State now extends from the eastern border of Iraq to the outskirts of Aleppo in the north, to the eastern Qalamun in the centre and to the deserted eastern districts of Suwayda region in the south.
Some of the armed actors that were successful in the first part of 2015, such as the People’s Protection Unit (YPG), ISIL and the pro-Saudi/Qatari/Turkish AOG coalition in Idlib, have tried to consolidate their territorial gains and create buffer zones and outposts from which they launched raids against their direct rivals. These actors are fully aware that they cannot expand their control ad libitum and must cope with the limits imposed by geography and military strategies, as well as by sectarian, ethnic and socioeconomic factors. The ISIL attacks (May 2015) in the Palmyra region and ISIL’s presence in the southern suburbs of Damascus, for instance, were not indicative that the jihadist group aims to establish permanent control in the capital or in the western side of Homs region.
Other actors, such as the GoS and some AOGs, continued to defend their positions, strengthening the main lines of entrenchment to avoid major losses. At the local level, this resulted in more complex interactions among actors to maintain or increase political and economic power in their areas of influence. In particular, the governmental forces and their allies strengthened their trenches to secure the capital from the threats from Daraa and Qunaytra and guarantee their territorial contiguity with the coastal region and Aleppo through Homs and Hama.
Despite the prolonged status of the war and the deterioration of humanitarian conditions, multifaceted civil society organizations continued the struggle to carry on their activities. In safer areas, civil activists widened the scope of their work on the ground. Due to the highly polarized context and shifting alliances, however, they encountered serious difficulties in expanding their networks across battle lines.